IDEALS AND OBLIGATIONS IN PLATO)S ETHICS*
Thrasymachus' manifesto in the REPUBLIC is one of the most discussed texts in the history of ethics. Generations of philosophers have wondered if his amoral stance is really refuted by Plato's answer. In order to un derstand the answer we must first come to understand Thrasvmachus. Even a cursory perusal should convince us that his position is more than a mere attempt at defining justice or rightness . The oft quoted slogan "justice is what is in the interest of the stronger" hides an anal|ysi« that can be best labelled as moral scepticism. For Thrasymachus argues (338el-339a*0 "that all this talk about justice and its rational foundation is empty. What we call justice i« really a set of injunctions that those with power force upon us. This is not a definition, but rather a sceptical explanation of the data that philosophical definitions try to analyze. A modern statement of Thrasy machus' position would be: "what we all callpjustice is in fact nothing but whatever persons with power impose upon us."^ If Thrasymachus is right, then there is no rational foundation for justice and rightness. Ethicrs should be replaced by a branch of political science that studies power and predict« or explains domination in different societies.
One would expect Plato to reply to Thrasymachus by showing that justice and morality can be given rational foundation«, and that invoking these notions is not just a sham perpetrated on us by the mighty. But this i« not what Plato does. Instead, he leads Tharsymachu« to commit himself to further claims. In particular, he elicits from Thrasymachus a description of the life-ideal that he professes (3^3d-3^hl). This is the ideal of the tyrant, or the strong and powerful person.
This move should give us pause. For there is no logical link between the two theses. Moral scepticism is compatible with any number of life-ideals. I might agree, for example, that all this talk about what is right is merely a manifestation of what the ruining classes want, and then go on to proclaim as my life-ideal that of a quiet retiring individual with a few gentle pleasures and with no intention to dominate anybody.
Our key questions, then, should be: a) Why does Plato link Thrasymachus' moral scepticism to a certain life-ideal? and b) how does he reply to these two theses?
Many modern discussions assume, that Plato's task is to challenge the claim that justice leads to misery and injustice leads to happines«. In the course of working out this scheme modern interpreters have to come to grips with the fact that Plato describes a certain inner psychological condition as justice, and thus needs to connect this notion of justice with the notion of justice as meeting one's obligations. Other interpreters try to show that Plato defends the notion of just and fair dealings with others as intrin sically good, regardless of consequences for one's own happiness or that of others.
If Plato's reply is to show that justice pays rather than injustice, then he is an early example of a kind of utilitarianism. If he is showing thf justice is intrinsically good, hut in fact makes us also happv, then he is a Kantian with an additional -dubious -psychological thesis.
If one is to think that these are the only alternatives, then one is tacitly subscribing to a typical çonception çf ethicsk held in modern times according to which the main questions of ethics are those of utility and obligation; and depending on how one links these two, one is a deontologist or a utilitarian. But not all ethical theories contain only these two components. For specifying utility must assume some answer to the question: "useful to whom, or to what kind of a person?" Thus a complete ethical theory must have three components. A) A substantive theory of the Good (^tg from here on); i.e. a theory that specifies what it is to be human, and what it is to be a flourishing human. B) A theory of utility fov the -2-individual and for collectives that specifies means to the substantive good, and ways of calculating the means. Ill· A theory of obligations both in terms of bonds between individuals, and $n terms of societal links such as the distribution of goods, and the acceptance of rights.
A good example of a modern ethical theory that contains all three parts is that of John Rawls . In the first two parts of his book Rawls develops the notion of justice as fairness, and in the third part he presents his STG. As Rawls' theory shows, a rational foundation for claims about justice has to indicate what the justifications of these claims are, and how these are related to questions of utility and an adequate STG. An STG may be a "thin" theory or one with much content. Even a hedonist has an STG, though a "thin" one. According to the STG of a hedonist, a flourishing human being is a creature that can and should have pleasures, and this capacity of his is of supreme importance. We shall see why Plato rejects this STG.
An STG may be related to matters of obligation in different ways. Typically, the connection will follow utilitarian or non-utilitarian lines. As we shall see, however, other alternatives are also open. This paper has two main claims. First, it will argue that most of what is usually interpreted as Plato's ethics is concerned primarily with the establishing of an STG. Secondly, it will be shown that Plato's link between his STG sind matters of obligation is a very close one, and cannot be analyzed either along utilitarian or Kantian lines.
If one is to interpret Plato's ethics along the lines suggested, one arrives at the. following outline of the REPUBLIC. The argument starts with two claims of Thrasymachus* i) moral scepticism and ii) the tyrannical S^G. Plato's reply starts already in 353d3-35^a9 (Bk.I.). He points out that since humans form a natural species, they must have certain natural functions and capacities ("erga"). In Bk.IV. Plato gives the outline of his STG. This is his famous theory of the flourishing soul as inner harmony (^36a8-*j44a2 ). Inner harmony for Plato includes a certain dominant role for reason. This role can be under stood only if we see in the bàckground of REPUBLIC IV the philosophical psychology developed in the SYMPOSIUM. In 442e^-i|43b5 Plato maintains also that a person with the right STG will adopt the attitude and conduct required by justice; i.e. the notion that encompasses our obligations and fairness towards others.
Books V-VII explain and justify the metaphysical and epistemological premisses involved in Plato's STG. In Books VIII and IX Plato compares his STG with alternatives and concludes not only that his STG is superior, but also that a person living according to this ideal will have his own enjoy ments.
One argument for adopting this interpretation is that following the outline sketched here enables us to construct a much better detailed inter pretation of the REPUBLIC than what we can achieve if we follow the assum ptions adopted by those who try to forte Plato into the utilitarian or deontologist moulds.
There is, however, one passage that has crucial direct bearing on our At this point we should try to understand why Plato insists that Thrasymachus must have an STG. Plato seems to assume that anvone with a full set of principles for conduct will have, explicitly or otherwise, an STG. Though Plato gives no argument for this assumption, there are enough hints in the text to provide a basis for reconstructing the tacitly assumed argument. Plato sees that everyone addressing questions of right choice m u s t ' assume some conception of the self as an acting agent, and that such a con ception must be partly normative. The reasoning behind this thought is the following. One can try to explain human nature from an observer's point-of view. Onr would eventually arrive at a characterization that would form the basis for predictions about human behaviour. Plato, however, does not stait from this point of view. Plato, starts from the point of view of the acting agent askings "what shall I do?" In order to give a rational answer to this que$tion one must have a conception of the self with builtin priorities. A conception of the self without priorities would have to be a list of all of the parts, attributes, as well as trivial details of life history. Without priorities one might end up sacrificing one's emotional capacities for the sake of a toe, or one's ability to cooperate for the sake of a fleeting moment of pleasure. We must assume that some parts and attri butes are more important than others. Up to a point biology helps us to set the priorities. It tells us that the heart more important than the finger-nails and the brain is more important than hair. But this leaves u·3 with a lot of slack, and attempts to squeeze out priorities from allegedly analytic delineations of what it is to be a human stilly leaves us without guidance for cases in which we must choose between feelings of attachment and the development of competitive excellences. Yet these are what William James would have called "forced options" for humans. An agent is a planning creature, and plans presuppose some overall scheme of priorities among human parts and attributes. The way Plato describes the acting and choosing agent suggests that thiQ is roughly the line of reasoning that he assumes as background. His STG as inner harmony with reason "in control" is at once a specification of a flourishing human and a characterization of the basic priorities that a rational planning agent should assume. For Plato all questions of utility are relative to this conception. Thrasymachus too has an STG. He thinks that the primary goods are pleasure, and power. Piatn challenges Thrasymachus· notion of poWer (_ •I) and provides a different S'T' G.
-Λ -As we noted above, Plato does not give much of an explanation of how the STG is linked to public morality. He asserts that a human with the right STG will riot commit acts of unfairness and injustice towards others. Hence one should, consider a few ways of filling out the argument.
Al. This supplementary argument could be captured bv the slogans "inner harmony leads to harmony with others." Thus construed Plato advances here a psychological thesis. It would asert that a person whose inner har mony allows reason to specify ends, whose desires and attitudes are lead by reason (i.e. the objects of the desires will have characteristics that warrant the desires or attitudes in question) and whose reason spells out both the constituents and appropriate means for a flourishing life, wilîjnot have desires or attitudes determining his actions that would lead, to immo rality.
A2. Plato might have thought that a person' with the right STG, i.e. the inner harmony spelled out above, would find public moralitv to be useful. A3· The tacit Platonic argument could be that persons with the right STG require (or necessarily constitute) a kind of community for which moral conduct is essential.
Of these alternatives A2 is the weakest candidate. For though acting with fairness to others would be much preferable from the point of view of maintaining the STS than acting immorally, the moral conduct misht have such sources as benevolence or sympathy, and under certain circumstances these sources take attention away from the pursuit of reason and under standing. The most that one could say is that acting with unfairness towards others would turn the soul away from the pursuit of the right qTG. ^hus A2 gives us a negative reason? i.e. one that says why a human is being harmed by immorality. A2 does not give us grounds for pursuing the positive things that go into being a human who is fair and meets obligations.
This negativity carries over also to some extent to Al. It is easy to ^how that under normal circumstances a person with the Platonic STG would not have interest in acts like murder and adultery. It is much less easy to show 41lat such a person might never resort to such activities, even if in some contexts these could be shown to be the least disastrous means to securing the pursuit of understanding. Also, Al does not say anything about the kinds of conflicts in which increasing my knowledge and rationality clashes with the development of rationality in others. Al could be invoked to show that the Platonically good person would n o t be possessive. This is, however, not the same as showing that such a person would have basic respect for others.
It seems, then, that from the point of view of a Platonistic Philosoph A3 would be the most appropriate candidate for filling out the argument linking the STG with public morality. Plato believes that the development of rationality and understanding is a necessarily cooperative enterprise. For Plato self knowledge involves understanding the rationality that is within a person, and thi^ -in his view -requires a community. Further more valuing rationality leads -according to Plato -to a desire to maxi mize its instantiations. This again requires a community. Thus the establi shing and maintaining of inner harmony requires a community. This community is based on shared ideáis and cooperative enterprises. Members of this community would see each other as partners and contributors in the project of increasing knowledge and rational control in humans. Regarding each other in this manner would constitute the basis for mutual respect and taking inte rest in the welfare of all members of the communitv. Without such respect andf interest one would cut oneself off from sources of self knowledge and from the context within which the pursued values can be maximized. Since the answer to this question is Plato's defense of hi* STG and his comparisons with alternative ST G 's, the answer would be neither utilitarian, nor Kantian. When Rawls says that "humans should be rational" or Plato says that "humans should have inner harmony", they are using 'should" in a sense that is neither utilitarian nor a 'should' of obligation. This 'should' indicates not utility or obligation, but the 'should' in terms of which one spells out what it ί ς · to be a well functioning human agent relative to whom questions of utility can be raised and relative to whom obligations are specified.
V5 So far we have discussed Plato's STG without having examined in detail its content. One of its key features is the condition that reason must "rule" over the soul. Unpacking thi$ metaphor will considerable insight into this STG. * We can say initially that according to Plato the control of reason involves our emotions, feelings, attitudes, and desires having their proper objects. This requirement needs justification. Why should we not say that any desire or emition should be satisfied or fulfilled as long as such proceses will bring pleasure? Plato's reply has two parts. In his examination? of pleasure in the GORGIAS and the PHILSBUS he posits " PI. The plasticity of human nature. A human can experience enjoyment in connection with a wide variety of activities, and can change his inner state so as to alter the sources for his enjoyment. Thu«* for example if a person enjoys eating a lot and subsequently convin ces himself that this is bad for him, he can not only change his eating habit? but can also become a person who enjoys eating less and only helthy food. Again, if a person enjoys dominating others and convinces himself that it would be better to lead a life of cooperation and sharing, then such a person is able to change his desires and emotions so that he will enjov the sharing and the cooperation. This shows that Plato ha¿ a dynamic view of human enjoyment. According to the static conception humans have a basic set of pleasures and enjoyments that correspond to fixed needs, and our task is simply to seek the best means for the meeting of these needs. The dynamic conception sees most human needs as dependent on our conceptions of ourselves. Changes in outlook and perso nality can change needs and hence sources of enjoyment.
PI. states a psychological fact. It does not lead, by itself, to a normative critique of possible objects for desires or emotions. In ord^r to lay the foundation of siich a critique, we need the conjunction of PI and another principle: P2. Not all objects of desire or attitude are of equal worth. For Plato a rational life involves enjoying those things that one values as well. PI. tells us that we can change our sources of enjoyment, and P2 tells us that such changes can be undertaken from the point of view of proper evaluations.
Plato's theory of rational desires is assumed in the middle books of the REPUBLIC. The details are laid out in SYMPOSIUM 210-212, the famous passage of the ascent to Beauty.
A key condition for the understanding of this text is the realization that Plato uses 'eros' to denote a generic relation which includes what we would call desire, attitude, love, aspiration, and interest. Plato draws these distinctions sole\y in terms of the differentiations of objects for eros.
-7 -0 /ln modern philosophy we differentiate different desires', attrtudes, and enytions either in terms of causal mechanisms that bring these about®, or in terms of introspectively registered qualities. Plato rejects in+rospection as a reliable guide for mental topography, and he does not know of causal mechanisms of the required sort; hence his reliance on objectual differen tiations. His theory has advantages when applied to certain mental states. His is a "magnet-theory" of eros, for he sees objects of various states or dispositions as magnets that can evoke various attitudes. The purely objec tual specifications require us to translate one Gr eek word, 'eros' with a variety of English expressions such as desire, love, liking, attitude, emotion, aspiration or interest. The ddvantage of Plato's theory is tha+ he can explain shifts between these non-rational states as the agent moves his attention from one object to the other. The framework is also advan+ageou? when it comes to accounting for intellectual interest. Platonic "eros" for mathematics i«? being interested in mathematics. We know of no causal mechanisr that will explain the rise of intellectual interest, and introspectively re gistered qualities do not enable us to demarcate the various intellectual interests of a person. Finally, Plato can point to a common element that even within the modern framework all types of "ero5" share. For each of these involve valuing (or "holding dear" "philein") an object.
Plato sets up a general framework for rational "eros" and then within this he has more specific proposals. A rational "eros" in the general sense of this notion has the following structure?
person P has eros E towards an object x in virtue of x 's characteristic C , C", ...Cn ' where the attribute-set is a subset of the total attributes of x.(In order to simplify exposition, we shall make the obviously unrealistic assumption that the eros is in virtue of one attribute Cn). "he "in virtue of" link is to show that though Cn may play a causal role in the development of E, its primary role is that of justification. So thi^ type of eros is to be contrasted with those in which Cn might play a causal r¿>le in the development of E, it would not be invoked by the agent as justification.
Plato's special thesis within this general framework is that only certair attributes can function as adequate justifications. For example, one can admire another person for the right or for the wrong reasons. "he same can be said for desires, interest, etc. Thus reason rules the soul when eros deve lops in a rational manner -as specified above -and +he eros-grounding attributes are the appropriate ones. Discovering new attributes in an^objcet opens up the possibility of new evaluations, and hence new "eros". ^his is, then, the first part of Plato's theory. The second part involves progression through four stages. This too is an integral part of the notion of inner harmony. We start with 51. P has E towards x in virtue of Cn. It is clear both from the SYMPOSIUM and the REPUBLIC that Plato is consi dering this case under idealized circumstances. We must assume, foAExample, that the eros developed solely in virtue of the recognition and valuation of Cn, and that x has no attributes that would cancel out Cn 's magnetism. Furthermore, if Cn is the right kind of attribute than it must lead to or be a constituent of what Plato regards as goodness. Finally, the history of our relationship with x is ignored, and so are possibilities of reciprocity, limitations on information, attention span, and the limits of our energies.
Understood this way SI leads to x 's particularity dropping out of the picture. The only relevant condition for E is that the object has Cn. Hence Plato assumes that the rational person will move from SI to 52. P has E towards all and any x that has Cn. For once we focus on the attribute that makes x a suitable object for E, we can generalize and see that under the appropriate idealization^, any+hing possessing the right attribute will serve as the object of E.
-8-By abstracting away not only from the uniqueness of any one x that has Cn, but also from the fact thst Cn happens to have instances, Plato expects the good human to arrive a t s . S3· P has 5 towards Cn. This grates on the modern ear. One can admire all persons of courage, but how can we admire courage itself? Our difficulties, however, may stem from an overly restricted interpretation of eros.
is more plausible if we take it to be basically valuation or interest. If I value courageous persons, then I value courage. If I take án interest in all beautiful things, .then, given the idealization conditions mentioned above, I will take an \mterest in beauty. There are three reasons why Plato wants to go beyond S2 and move to S3· One of these is the metaphysics within which the theory is couched. The other is that this enables Plato to deal with the fact that Forms are only contingently instantiated. If my interest in would be restric ted to beautiful things, then I would have no interest in beauty when it is not instantiated. Thirdly, it is S3 rather than c2 that leads to: S^. If P has S towards Cn, then P wants Cn to have as many instances as possible (or: P wants "as much Cn as possible"). This step captures the steps of creation that are parts of the ascent of the SYMPOSIUM, and gives for these motivation. We move from S3 to S^, because if we have a real interest in Cn and value it highly, +hen -ceteris paribus -we will want "as"much of it as possible"; i.e. have it instantiated as ! 4âany times as possible.' If one values courage, then one wants as many instances of it as possible. Furthermore, our interest at this stage is in having Cn instantiated at any time and in any place. The interest i° not restricted to wanting instances for ourselves.
The eros developed at this stage is neither egoistic nor altruistic. In the early stage we have an egoistic eros; we want something for ourselves. But as we concentrate on the reason that leads us from one eros to the other, we leave egoism behind. Our eros comes to have first a more generalized and then a more abstract object, and it makes no sense to want an attribute all to oneself. If we have a genuine interest in an attribute, then we would not want to be its sole insurance.
The process is cumulative. As we move along, we do not abandon the previous objects of ero®. If I desire healthy food, then eventually the Platonic theory of how reason should control my attitudes will lead me to wanting healthy food in the world in general. This does not mean that I don't want healthy food formyself.
The attribute C^i is in some cases, as the example of healthy food shows, a species of a larger genus. There are species d# beauty, health, knowledge, etc. in the development of understanding, these relationships will b e 'discovered. This should lead to the appropriate modifications of eros. Thus there is a general condition of E-development: S5. If P has E towards Cn, and Cn is a "part" o^ kind of a more generic Form C, then P will have E also towards C.
Thus, for example, we move from eros towards a certain kind of beauty to eros for beauty itself.
Let us take again the example of healthy food. Starting with a desire for healthy food, I come to form a certain attitude towards all healthy things, and eventually towards health itself. I will then want to see as much health in the world as possible. Of course, one needs to add that my desires need to be compatible with each other, and that other considerations might constrain my efforts -to have more health in the world.
I might also develop a yearning for having ExfKiKudx someone as a friend. This should lead me to wanting anyone with those attributes as a friend, and eventually I should be led to the point of seeing the value of friendship, an^ M n<Bfiew^ô i H S a l 0pK §?ïbiewards there being, as many friends and friendship -9-Alternatively, one might become interested in a mathematical proof because of its abstractness, explanatory power, and elegance. One would then generaliz the object of interest to anything with those attributes, and after one has focussed on the attributes themselves, one would want to create as many ins tances of elegant mathematical proofs as possible. Similar considerations will bear on examples involving admiration or approval.
As we can see, Platonic eros is not the eros of a consumer. Ordinarily we think of a person who desires food as someone who wants food for himself and once he has it he consumes it. But the Platonic person, though he will no+ starve, will go further than that. Having enjoyed the food, he will focus on its good making characteristics, and after the generalization of the object of eros he will take an interest in the goodness of the product and will want to have as much of it available to mankind; as possible. In the case of the objects of noetic interest the matter of consumer-attitude does not arise, since these objects cannot be consumed in any clear sense. More than one person can work on the same mathematical proof, but only one person can consum a given portion of food.
The Platonic analysis of eros works best for attitudes like interest, admiration, or approval. Plato probably did think that all of the different types of eros should culminate in intellectual interest, or at least that intellectual interest should, be the highest form of eros, even if we do keep all of the other types.
We can see how egocentricity is dissolved even in the case of the other types of eros. If I want money because it makes me happv, then I will -on reflexion -want everything that makes me happv. But if happiness is something objectively valuable, then I should be interested in it, and thus in its spseading as far as possible, regardless of whether it is mv happinesor that of others that is being promoted. This analysis of the Platonic attitudes helps us to understand what it is for reason to "rule". The Platonic ^TG assigns to rfta^on the following rules* a) reason fixes ultimate ends since it shows us what has objec+ive value°b) reason informes our attitudes in the manner specified above c) by informing our attitudes it enables these to counteract impulses and appetites d) it elicits intellectual interest from the healthy person.
At least three factors should be mentioned that Plato invokes in justifvi this FTG. First, as we saw already, Plato thinks that inner harmony fulfills our human functioning, or "ergon". Secondly, as his description of education in hi^ Cave-analogy show«, inner harmony realizes freedom, for a person with inner harmony is free to realize ends that he chooses on reflexion, and i<= free to change in directions deemed valuable. Thirdly, such a person achieves selfsufficiency (LYSIS 215a) since he not dependent for his welfare on accidental environmental features, or on the opinions of others.
Our analysis of Plato's STG showed that from the point of view of eros the objects are always analyzed as merely coinstantiations of attribute«-^. It is important to note, however, that from the point of view of erás the self too is analyzed this way. Plato does not give different analyses for respect for others and self respect, or admiration of others and admiration of the self. If I approve og myself or respect mvself, or love myself, this must be -if warranted -in virtue of my possessing a restricted set of attributes, This means, however, that the same steps apply as in the case of other objects. Thus the adoption of the Platonic attitudes lea^s to a conception of the self according to which the self is transformed into a mere set of coinstantiations ylft as much as other objects are. ^his should change our ways of interpreting "wanting something for myself". For once the Platonic attitudes are adopted, this will amount to saying that I want instantiations of certain Forms in such a way that these should be causally related to a sPöcial "bundle of qualities" namely myself. But once it is put that we see_why Plato would regard such a restriction as arbitrary. If the attributes m question do have objeotive worth,why s h o u W thelr instantiations -10-be related to a set of coinstantiations to which they happen to have a causal link? If the attitude is warranted, then I should want to have the object have as many instantiations as possible, regardless of their contingent causal relations. Self-interest becomes in this way transformed into interest in the Good and its parts and instances. This is the deepest aspect of Plato's "reason rules" principle.
Evidence for this interpretation is provided not only by the fact that we can read the relevant passages in the SYMPOSIUM and the REPUBLIC in a more satisfactory way, but also directly by REPUBLIC 5^?h7-c^, where Pla+o makes i+ clear that the emergence of interest in the self and the accompanying possessi veness is caused by the abadonment of reason. This is, once more stfctn^fe. to the modern ear. We tend to associate reason and self interest, and not to oppose them. ButBWe see that by "rationality" Plato means the conceptions of self and other objects that was sketched above, then this passage makes good sense. Once I stop seeing myself and other objects of eros as "bundles of qualities", I ts see them as the unreflective person would? the self is a center of individuality, and other objects become important because of their alleged uniqueness that they have for me in view of my interactions with /them.
Once we see these implications of the Platonic psychology, we can solve two-.groblems set by the interesting analysis of eros provided by G. Santas' 1 -. Oirçe of these concerns the thesis that ero® indicates deficiency. Now it is true that initially the person who develops eros towards something feels a deficiency in himself.
But by the time his attitudes are trans formed in the manner outlined above, the deficiency too is generalized, and is construed as the world lacking sufficient numbers of instances of the object of eras. Again, there might be -on the surface -a conflict between eros towards obtaining something, and the eros of keeping what we wanted. But the truly Platonic eros dissolves this distinction. "Obtaining" starts the process, but by the time we moved through SI -S^, what we want i^ mofe instances of the object? and this amounts to both obtaining more of the afform in this world and m a i n l i n i n g it.
In conclusion one should note the incomplete character of +he ethics that falls out of Plato's rTG and the close link he envisages be+ween this and matters of obligation. We are not told how to resolve conflicts between different goods, or between different realizations of the same good. We are not told anything about how to distribute goods, and we are not given anv grou for rights. It i^ not clear how Plato would handle rational wishes for something that we want instantiated only in rare cases. For example, one might want a certain type of doctor or teacher to exist without wanting it to be the case that every doctor or teacher should be like that. One would have to go much beyond the Platonic texts to construct an ethics that deals with all of these issues. Even if such a reconstruction were to be made, we might find that muerh of ethics would be autonomous in the sense that it would have no close link to Plato's STG.
There are a few arguments towards the end of Book IX about the STg lead in to a pleasant life. We have seen already that this can be taken in at leas+ two . If Plato were to argue that there is a general notion of pleasure, in terms of which the Platonic human has more of this than humans with other STG's, then this would have to be a separate argument, independent of the justification of the ^TG. The construction of the REPUBLIC! i* like the dialectical construction of other dialogues such as the MENO, PHAEDO, "YMPOSIU and ^OPHIST. The dome-like structure indicates that the deepest theories form the inner core of the dialogue, and that what is in the beginning and the end are on a more concrete and common sensical level. Hence one should not attribute too much importance to these -clearly inadequate -arguments aboV't pleasure at the end·11.
